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LENDING TO RURAL POOR THROUGH INFORMAL GROUPS: 
A PROMISING FINANCIAL MARKET INNOVATION? 
Dale W Adams and Jerry R. Ladman* 
Recently, many low income countries (LICs) have attempted to in-
crease formal loans going to agriculture in general and to the rural poor in 
particular. Most have been successful in expanding agricultural loans, but 
few have made much progress in reaching the rural poor. Public as well as 
private financial institutions have resisted lending to the rural poor be-
cause small loans are relatively expensive to administer, many potential 
borrowers of small amounts have unsatisfactory loan collateral, and in-
terest rate restrictions severely limit the revenue which lenders get from 
small loans. To overcome these problems, LICs have experimented with 
various financial market innovations in order to more efficiently serve the 
rural poor. These include special central bank rediscount facilities, loan 
guarantees, tax concessions, concessionary reserve requirements, highly 
specialized new lending institutions, credit cooperatives 1 supervised 
credit programs, and nationalized banks . 
Recently I some LICs have experimented with still another financial 
market innovation 1 group lending .1 In a few cases like Bolivia, Ghana, 
Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey a substantial portion of loans 
to small farmers is made through these groups. In other cases such as 
Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Malawi, Nepal, Lesotho, Ivory Coast, 
and Sri Lanka gmup lending is done on a regional or pilot project basis. 
Typically ,groups are small--S to 30 members--and seldom have legal status. 
Groups usually receive nonsecured loans which are then distributed to members 
who have joint liability for repayment. If technical assistance accompanies 
the loan, it is given to the group rather than to individuals. 
At least five advantages are claimed for group lending. For the 
lender: (1) default risks are reduced because of joint liability; (2) loan 
transaction costs per unit of money lent are reduced by making one sizable 
loan rather than a number of small individual loans; (3) technical services 
can be introduced more cheaply than if they were provided to individuals; 
and (4) scarce manpower can be spread more thinly than if individual loans 
were made, and thus provide institutional credit to rural poor who otherwise 
would be excluded. Moreover, small borrowers (5) should benefit because 
borrower transaction costs for group loans should be less, per unit of money 
borrowed, than for individual loans . 
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Despite the growing importance of group lending in LICs 1 only a small 
amount of research has been done on the subject. This paper summarizes 
the findings of the few studies done on the various advantages claimed. We 
end up by drawing a few tentative conclusions for policymakers. 
Joint Liability 
The joint liability of a group loan is attractive to lenders. In theory I 
it offers the lender more loan repayment security at a lower cost than typically 
is available from individual small loans. In many LICs lt is virtually im-
possible 1 for political as well as legal reasons I for lenders to foreclose on 
land mortgaged by small farmers. Ideally I through groups I peer pressure may 
be invoked to force recalcitrant borrowers to repay. Thus lender costs of col-
lecting overdue loans are reduced because the group acts as a collecting agent. 
Experience shows that joint liability yields mainly negative results. In 
the Philippines I where groups were hastily formed and members felt little or 
no obligation to each other I joint liability has been a mirage. 2 If several mem-
bers fail to repay I other members may refuse to pay the defaulting members• 
shares I and also decide to default on their own loans. As a result, the entire 
group defaults and disbands. More typically I as in the cases of Bolivia and 
Ghana I the lender does not enforce joint liability. If several members of the 
group do not repay their share of the loan, the lender absorbs the loss, the 
defaulters are dismissed from the group, and a new loan is granted to the re-
constituted group . 3 
Peer pressure appears to have been effective in improving repayment 
performance in only relatively few cases. A group lending program in Malawi, 
for example, has experienced relatively high repayment rates. This is due I in 
part, to a required deposit of 10 percent of the total value of the group loan 4 
which must be deposited in cash with the lender at the time the loan is made. 
The deposit is placed in a blocked interest-bearing account which is unblocked 
once the loan is repaid in full. If the loan is partially repaid I the deposit is 
used to cover shortfalls. Nepal has a similar scheme; the Agricultural De-
velopment Bank withholds 5 percent of the value of loans made to groups. If a 
group repays its loan in full, the 5 percent forced savings is turned over to 
the group for its uses. In some countries, village or group leaders are re-
sponsible for loan recovery. This appears to work well where village organi-
zations are strong or where the informal group derives substantial "organization 
good" in addition to access to formal credit. 5 Where the sole reason for form-
ing the group is to get a loan, the additional good may be nil. The forced 
savings features of some group lending programs may help to provide part of 
this noncredit organizational good. 
The information available from several countries on repayment per-
formance strongly suggests that the quality of loan services provided to the 
group by lenders is closely associated with the willingness of borrowers to 
repay. If the borrower views the lending program as temporary, if loans 
arrive late 1 if the lender• s technical assistance is close to worthless, and if 
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the lender does not provide emergency credit to borrowers 1 group members may 
lose little by not maintaining a good credit rating. Borrowers who damage their 
credit rating by defaulting on loans from lenders providing high quality financial 
services lose something substantial. 
Lender Transaction Costs 
Lenders incur two types of loan transaction costs in making loans to the 
rural poor. The first is the direct costs of making I administering I and collect-
ing the loans. These direct costs of lending I per unit of money lent I vary in-
versely with the size of the loan. Other things being equal, small individual 
loans should be more expensive per unit of money lent than would a larger loan 
made to a group. The second type of cost is made up by supervision or technical 
assistance provided the borrower by the lender. In a few countries 1 such as 
Bolivia and the Philippines I these technical services are provided by a national 
extension service I and society at large absorbs these transaction costs. In 
most countries the group lending agencies must absorb these technical service 
costs: e.g. I Bangladesh I Dominican Republic I Nepal and Sri Lanka. 
Group lending agencies may also incur a third type of cost 1 that of forming 
groups. In the Dominican Republic the Dominican Development Foundation (DDF) 
bears the entire cost of forming its groups. 6 Their groups must function 3-12 
months before a group loan is granted. Meanwhile I DDF promotion agents work 
intensively with the group to develop group objectives 1 cohesion, and to weed 
out weak members. Group formation costs are a very large item in the overall 
budget of DDF. 
In Turkey and Nepal group formation costs are very small because loans 
are made through existing village organizations or traditional informal groups. 
In Thailand and Ecuador organizations responsible for forming cooperatives bear 
most of the costs cf setting up precooperatives which receive group loans from 
formal credit sources. In Bolivia and the Philippines very little time or effort 
has been spent in forming groups. In some cases a few small farmers who were 
standing in line to negotiate individual loans with the lenders were joined on 
paper and received a group loan. 
Efficiency of Providing Technical Services 
Little information is available on the costs of providing technical assistance 
to individual or groups of small farmers. As indicated previously I in those coun-
tries where the national extension service is responsible for providing assistance 
to groups, the amount of service extended is minimal; weak extension services 
cannot be expected to work miracles • Groups involved in regional or pilot pro-
jects receive more intensive supervision. In the Mexican Puebla project groups 
may be visited almost weekly by project technicians. 7 Similar intensive super-
vision and training occurs in Bangladesh, Malawi and the Dominican Republic. 
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In most cases where technical assistance is effective I an agency apart 
from the lender provides subsidies to fund most of the costs; in the Dominican 
Republic I DDF has received grants from various sources over the years and in 
the Puebla project the Rockefeller Foundation has funded a number of project 
costs. In one Bangladesh project technical assistance is provided by a uni-
versity. 8 Evidence suggests that group technical assistance works best when 
groups produce a single commodity I group members have homogeneous character-
istics I and groups hold well-attended regular meetings at which significant 
business is transacted. 
Spread Scarce Manpower 
The experience of countries where group lending is extensive and also 
countries with mainly regional and pilot group lending projects I shows that new 
borrowers can be reached through group lending. In Ghana I for example 1 in 
1976 the Agricultural Development Bank made loans to 3,403 groups with a total 
of 74~278 members. In the Dominican Republic DDF served 4 1 668 borrowers 
through 212 groups in 1977-1978. The limited manpower of these institutions 
would not have enabled them to service these small borrowers on an individual 
basis. Similar comments can be made about group lending activities in Bolivia 1 
the Philippines and Thailand. 
Although group lending activities allow serving a larger number of small 
borrowers 1 the key question is whether these limited technicians can recover a 
substantial portion of the larger loan volume. In the Philippines I repayment 
rates by groups have deteriorated steadily since 1973 when group lending was 
initiated 1 and has forced lenders to sharply reduce group loans. There has also 
been a reduction in the number of borrowers through groups in the Dominican 
Republic and Bolivia. Spreading a staff too thinly and including large numbers 
of untested new borrowers in the program can seriously affect repayment per-
formance and sharply increase loan collection costs. 
Borrower's Loan Transaction Costs 
Typically 1 a borrower must visit the lender's office 2-3 times to apply 
and negotiate a loan I another 2-3 times to receive several releases of the loan 
and at least one visit to repay the loan. The borrower's costs of productive time 
lost I the transportation I commissions, lawyer's fees and even bribes can be 
substantial. These transaction costs often exceed the interest charges paid by 
new small borrowers. 
Consistently I across countries, group lending appears to reduce borrower's 
loan transaction costs. 9 Typically I borrowing costs for a group are kept low be-
cause only several designated group leaders spend time negotiating the loan. 
In Bolivia studies show group members have substantially less cash outlay and 
less time lost in getting a loan, than do farmers receiving individual loans. In 
the Dominican Republic and Bolivia 1 members of groups take informal collections 
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to cover out-of-pocket expenses for leaders who negotiate the loan. In other 
cases the group leadership is rotated periodically so that costs of negotiating 
the loans are shared among various members of the group. In rurkey these 
costs are minimal since bank officials visit the village to negotiate the loans • 
Most groups require members to attend periodic meetings to remain eligible 
for group participation. In the Dominican Republic and in Thailand members are 
forced to attend a large number of meetings before receiving loans .. Unless 
members benefit from meetings, because of information or organizational goods 
they receive, they may interpret these meetings as simply additional loan trans-
action costs . 
It is clear that farmers are generally leery of joining groups because they 
lose some degree of personal freedom, and if joint liability is enforced, they 
may be forced to cover someone else• s debt. Even worse, the individual may 
lose a good credit rating if the group does not repay its loan. Ceterus paribus, 
almost all borrowers would rather receive an individual loan. Despite these 
reservations I it appears that participants view lower transaction costs as strong 
incentives to seek loans through groups. Only in the Philippines do borrowers 
complain about their loan transaction costs being essentially equal for group 
loans and individual loans. 
Potential for Group Lending 
The ultimate usefulness of group lending will be determined by how it 
affects the overall costs of financial intermediation, and how these costs are 
shared among borrowers and lenders. If it is a useful innovation 1 it will re-
duce overall costs and also not increase the costs of any participant. 10 If the 
borrower• s costs are reduced, he or she will be more eager to participate in 
financial intermediation. If the lender's costs are reduced I he or she will be 
willing to increase the amount and quality of financial services provided to the 
rural poor. 
Too little research has been done on group lending to arrive at final con-
clusions about its potential. The fragmented evidence which is available, 
however 1 suggests it is no panacea; some group lending programs have performed 
poorly, while others have yielded satisfactory results. A few common elements 
do emerge 1 however. On the negative side, it appears that joint liability alone 
is not effective in improving repayment. Peer pressure works only where there 
is strong group solidarity, and relatively few groups have this. High loan re-
payment rates appear to be closely associated with high quality loan services. 
If these services, plus the other benefits derived from group membership, are 
sufficiently valuable to borrowers I they will repay their loans. Borrowers 
contrast the value of a good credit rating I continued access to loans, and other 
benefits of group participation with a once and for all income transfer through 
default. 
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On the positive side 1 most group lending programs substantially reduce 
borrower's loan transaction costs. It is not clear I however, whether the joint 
costs of both borrower and lender are reduced. In a number of cases the lender 
absorbs some transaction costs formerly incurred by borrowers under individual 
loans. In addition, the lender may be forced to spend a good deal of money to 
help form the group, and also to provide technical assistance I unless public 
funds are used for this purpose. The lender may face a Hobson's Choice of 
spending more on group formation and technical assistance I or spending more 
trying to collect bad debts from defunct groups. In either case 1 the lender's loan 
transaction costs for group loans are likely to be higher than for individual loans. 
If this turns out to be generally true I group lending will have little long run impact 
on expanding loans for the rural poor. It is becoming increasingly clear that 
rural poor make relatively little use of formal financial services because of supply-
side considerations rather than demand limitations. 11 
The limited success with group lending raises general questions about 
financial innovations. Clearly 1 some innovations fail because they do not reduce 
costs of financial intermediation. Others I however I reduce these costs I but 
also fail. Why? Some tentative answers to this question might be drawn from 
the recent experience with new high yielding seed varieties. These varieties 
were successful because they dramatically lowered production costs. But I equally 
important were the prices of the products. Would the miracle wheat varieties 
have been so highly successful if most governments had insisted on maintaining 
wheat prices substantially below equilibrium prices? VVe think not. The ubiquitous 
concessionary interest rate policies applied to small farmer loans in most low 
income countries seriously limit the net returns from any financial innovation like 
group lending. No lender can long survive when it receives 10 percent on a loan 
which costs the agency 25 to 30 percent. Even the most highly productive inno-
vation cannot overcome these kinds of price-cost differentials. We feel that more 
realistic and flexible interest rate policies would provide a more healthy economic 
and political environment for financial innovations like group lending. 
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